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Abstract 
China has embarked on an ambitious pathway for establishing a national carbon market in the next 
five to ten years. In this study, we analyze the distributional aspects of a Chinese emissions-trading 
scheme from ethical, economic, and stated-preference perspectives. We focus on the role of emissions 
permit allocation and first show how specific equity principles can be incorporated into the design of 
potential allocation schemes. We then assess the economic and distributional impacts of those 
allocation schemes using a computable general equilibrium model with regional detail for the 
Chinese economy. Finally, we conduct a survey among Chinese climate-policy experts on the basis of 
the simulated model impacts. The survey participants indicate a relative preference for allocation 
schemes that put less emissions-reduction burden on the western provinces, a medium burden on the 
central provinces, and a high burden on the eastern provinces. Most participants show strong support 
for allocating emissions permits based on consumption-based emissions responsibilities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Reducing the anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) linked to climate change 
is a major challenge for international governance. China surpassed the United States in 2007 to 
become the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2) (IEA, 2007; MNP, 2007) and has 
faced increasing international pressure to adopt stringent emissions-reduction commitments. In 
international negotiations China has pledged to reduce its carbon intensity, i.e. CO2 emissions 
per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 40% to 45% from 2005 levels by 2020 (NRDC, 
2009). 
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Mitigation of global climate change poses a classic collective action problem (Olson, 1971). 
The potency of international action depends on how the benefits and costs of national 
participation are distributed both across countries as well as within their own borders. Identifying 
arrangements that are widely perceived as equitable and cost effective can help to overcome 
collective action barriers. In large and diverse countries such as China the subnational 
distribution of costs and impacts may play a major role in determining the acceptability of 
national climate policy commitments. Basing the allocation of cost burden on well-accepted 
equity principles can enhance legitimacy and achieve the level of agreement needed to adopt 
policy, assuming agreement can be reached on the principles to be applied. Focusing on China as 
a case study, we evaluate the implications of using common equity principles to distribute the 
costs of an emissions trading system (ETS), and then empirically assess which approach is most 
acceptable to experts engaged in policy design. 
China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan for economic and social development (2011–2015) has 
integrated part of its international commitment into binding national policy. It sets forth the aim 
to reduce China's carbon intensity by 17% from 2011 to 2015 and lays out plans to gradually 
develop a carbon trading market. In 2011, the National Development and Reform Commission of 
China initiated the development of seven regional carbon trading pilots in five cities (Beijing, 
Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Shenzhen) and two provinces (Guangdong, Hubei). The pilots are 
expected to become operational in 2013 and inform the design of a national ETS to be 
announced in China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016–2020). 
An ETS has several well-studied advantages over a regional allocation of emissions targets. 
First, an ETS attains cost efficiency by incentivizing emissions reductions where they are 
cheapest. By contrast, regionally constrained emissions limits reduce abatement flexibility, 
leading to equal or greater welfare losses (see, e.g., Tietenberg, 2006; and Zhang et al., 2013, for 
an application to the Chinese context). Second, an ETS attains cost-efficiency irrespective of the 
initial allocation of emissions permits (Coase, 1960; Montgomery, 1972; Rose and Tietenberg, 
1993). Thus, efficiency and distributional (equity) objectives can be addressed separately in an 
ETS. The trade in emissions permits allows emissions to be reduced at least cost, while the initial 
allocation of emissions permits determines the regional distribution of this cost burden. 
Distributional issues have been a major concern for China’s policymakers in recent years. 
Pronounced differences exist between the developed eastern coastal provinces and the less 
developed central and western provinces (Keidel, 2007; Feng et al., 2009). Regional inequality 
has been rising since the late 1980s (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005) with only modest signs of decline 
(Zhang and Zou, 2012). Currently, the per capita GDP in the inland regions is less than half of 
that in the coastal regions on aggregate (Fan et al., 2011) and the differences between individual 
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provinces and municipalities can reach up to a factor of ten (National Statistics Bureau of China, 
2008).  
To a large extent, preferential policy treatment of coastal regions during China’s reform 
period in the late 1970s explains the existing regional economic differences (Démurger et al., 
2002). However, more recent regional development strategies in the 1990s and 2000s, such as 
the “western development strategy” and the “rise of central China strategy” have put increased 
focus on reducing regional disparities (Chen and Zheng, 2008). The importance of promoting a 
more balanced regional development has continued to feature prominently in the Eleventh and 
Twelfth Five-Year Plans for economic and social development (2006–2010; 2011–2015). 
In this study, we analyze the distributional aspects that are inherent in the design of a national 
emissions trading system. We focus on the different design options for allocating emissions 
permits to China’s provinces and the potential economic impacts that result. Opting for a specific 
allocation of emissions permits offers a means of balancing the regional economic impacts of an 
ETS and at the same time addressing issues of equity and distributional justice inherent in 
environmental policymaking (Grubb et al. 1992, Kverndokk, 1995).  
This study takes a three-part approach to analyze the distributional aspects of a national ETS 
in China. First, we construct a range of permit allocation schemes based on underlying ethical 
frameworks. This part builds on earlier studies on the international burden sharing of emissions 
reductions (see, e.g., Ringius et al., 2002; Kverndokk and Rose, 2008), but adapts the concepts 
discussed on the international level for the Chinese context.  
Second, we analyze the potential economic impacts of different permit allocation schemes by 
using an interregional energy–economic model of the Chinese economy that separately 
represents the nation’s 30 provinces. This part builds on an earlier assessment of a future ETS in 
China (Zhang et al., 2013) by explicitly considering different permit allocation schemes. By 
simulating the regional economic impacts of different allocation schemes in a future ETS, we 
also go beyond earlier studies which focused on the regional allocation of emissions-intensity 
reductions among China’s provinces without considering their economic impacts or interactions 
within an ETS (Wei et al., 2011; Yi et al., 2011).  
Third, we juxtapose the simulation results with insights based on an ETS survey conducted 
among Chinese research teams working on domestic climate policy analysis in China. The 
survey is intended to scope the views on the interregional distribution of burden in a future ETS 
in China and elicit the preferences for the specific permit allocation schemes analyzed in this 
study. The survey differs from one on the ethical preferences for different burden-sharing 
schemes conducted on the international level (Lange et al., 2007, 2010) due to its regional focus, 
intended use (informal versus econometrical), and consideration of a greater number of 
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allocation schemes. The three parts of the analysis are described below, followed by an 
integrated discussion of its implications.  
2. PERMIT ALLOCATION AND EQUITY CRITERIA 
Equity considerations are implicit in any approach aimed at distributing the burden of climate 
change (or the entitlement to emit). They indicate what a person perceives as fair or just 
(normative perspective). They are also frequently used in international negotiations on climate 
change (positive perspective), in the form of "common but differentiated responsibilities" laid 
out by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (United Nations, 1992, 
Art.3.1), or the polluter-pays principle endorsed by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD, 1972, 1989). 
There exist various categorizations of equity principles. For example, Rose et al. (1998) and 
Kverndokk and Rose (2008) group equity principles into allocation-based, outcome-based, and 
process-based. This study focusses on allocation-based and outcome-based approaches which 
inform the initial and final allocation of emissions permits, respectively. Table 1 provides an 
overview of the equity criteria selected for this study. Most of the criteria selected have become 
canonical (see Kverndokk and Rose, 2008, for a detailed review)—including the principles of 
sovereignty, egalitarian, polluter pays, ability to pay, horizontal, and vertical.  
We supplement the canonical equity criteria by three other criteria which are relevant for the 
Chinese context. We consider two criteria based on emissions intensity, the environmental 
reward and environmental subsidy criteria (see, e.g., Eyckmans and Finus, 2004), to capture 
China’s focus on emissions intensity as a policy target. We also add a consumer-pays criterion to 
account for the significant regional separation that exists within China between production and 
consumption activities and their associated CO2 emissions (Meng et al., 2011; Guo et al., 2012; 
Springmann et al., 2013; Feng et al., 2013).  
In the following, we will focus on specific allocation schemes emerging from the different 
equity principles. In order to use an equity principle to allocate emissions permits, one has to 
specify its reference base. A reference base, such as emissions or population, transforms an 
equity principle into an operational rule, but has no ethical content by itself (Rose and Stevens, 
1998). The reference bases applied to the equity criteria selected in this study are emissions 
(territorial and consumption-based), GDP, emissions intensity (i.e. emissions per unit of GDP), 
and population. 
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Table 1. Overview of various equity criteria, their definition, potential references bases, and 
the operational rules that follow. Scenario abbreviations are listed for further reference in 
the model and results sections. For detailed discussions on the equity criteria, see e.g., 
Rose et al (1998), Kverndokk and Rose (2008), Ringius et al. (2002), and Eyckmans and 
Finus (2004). 
Criterion Basic definition Reference 
base 
Operational 
rule 
Scenario 
Allocation-Based 
Sovereignty All regions have an 
equal right to pollute 
and to be protected 
from pollution. 
territorial 
emissions 
Distribute 
permits in 
proportion to 
emissions. 
SOV 
Polluter pays The producers of goods 
should be held 
responsible for the 
pollution generated in 
the process. 
territorial 
emissions 
Distribute 
permits 
inversely to 
emissions. 
PPP 
Consumer 
pays 
The consumer of goods 
should be held 
responsible for the 
pollution generated in 
the process. 
consumptio
n-based 
emissions 
Distribute 
permits 
inversely to 
emissions. 
CPP 
Egalitarian All people have an 
equal right to pollute 
and to be protected 
from pollution. 
population Distribute 
permits in 
proportion to 
population. 
EGA 
Ability to pay Greater burden should 
be shouldered by those 
with higher economic 
resources. 
inverse GDP  Distribute 
permits 
inversely to per 
capita GDP. 
ABT 
Environmental 
reward 
Greater burden should 
be shouldered by those 
with higher potential 
for reducing emissions. 
inverse 
emissions 
intensity 
Distribute 
permits 
inversely to 
emissions 
intensity. 
ERE 
Environmental 
subsidy 
The regions with the 
greatest potential for 
reducing emissions 
should be supported. 
emissions 
intensity 
Distribute 
permits in 
proportion to 
emissions 
intensity. 
ESU 
Outcome-Based 
Horizontal Regions with similar 
economic 
circumstances should 
bear similar burden. 
welfare Equalize welfare 
changes across 
regions. 
EQU 
Vertical Regions with higher 
per capita GDP should 
bear a greater burden. 
welfare Distribute net 
welfare losses in 
proportion to               
per capita GDP. 
PRG 
 
 6 
2.1 Database 
For specifying the equity criteria, reference bases, and the associated allocation schemes for 
the Chinese context, we employ a comprehensive database of economic activity, energy use, and 
the associated CO2 emissions for China’s provinces compiled by Zhang et al. (2013). The data is 
based on China’s national input–output table and the full set of China’s provincial input–output 
tables published in 2007 (National Statistics Bureau of China, 2011). The provincial input–
output data for China speciﬁes benchmark economic accounts for 30 provinces in China (Tibet is 
not included due to a lack of data and the small scale of its economic activities). Energy use is 
based on the 2007 China Energy Statistical Yearbook and emissions totals are quantified using 
fuel-specific CO2 emissions factors (National Statistics Bureau of China, 2008). Zhang et al. 
(2013) provide further details on the method used for balancing and combining the data sets.  
 
Figure 1. Overview of Chinese provinces included in the analysis. 
Note: The eastern provinces include Beijing (BEJ), Fujian (FUJ), Guangdong (GUD), Hainan (HAI), 
Hebei (HEB), Jiangsu (JSU), Liaoning (LIA), Shandong (SHD), Shanghai (SHH), Tianjin (TAJ), and 
Zhejiang (ZHJ); the central provinces include Anhui (ANH), Heilongjiang (HLJ), Henan (HEN), 
Hunan (HUN), Hubei (HUB), Jiangxi (JXI), Jilin (JIL), Neimenggu (NMG), and Shanxi (SHX); the 
western provinces include Chongqing (CHQ), Gansu (GAN), Guangxi (GXI), Guizhou (GZH), 
Ningxia (NXA), Qinghai (QIH), Shaanxi (SHA), Sichuan (SIC), Xinjiang (XIN), and Yunnan (YUN). 
 
For ease of presentation, we group China’s provinces into eastern, central, and western ones 
according to the three economic zones defined in China's Seventh Five-Year Plan (State Council 
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of China, 1986; Feng et al., 2012).
1
  Figure 1 provides the details of this regional aggregation. 
The eastern provinces belong to the most economically developed areas with high levels of 
industrialization and rapid growth in international trade. The central provinces are less developed 
than the eastern provinces, but they have well-established infrastructures and abundant natural 
resources, such as coal, oil, and metal ores. The western provinces are the least developed ones, 
but they possess abundant coal, oil and natural gas reserves. 
 
Figure 2. Regional distribution of (a) CO2 emission (100 million tons), (b) GDP (billion 
Yuan), (c) CO2 emission intensity (ton/10,000 Yuan), and (d) population (million) 
across China’s provinces in 2007. Tibet is not included due to data availability. 
 
Figure 2 shows the regional distribution of the indicators used as reference bases for this 
study’s allocation schemes (CO2 emissions, GDP, emissions intensity, and population). In 
general, population, economic activity, and CO2 emissions are most concentrated in the eastern 
provinces, less concentrated in the central provinces, and least concentrated in the western 
                                                 
1
 Following Feng et al. (2012), we group Guangxi as a western province due to its economic similarities with 
western provinces. Although Inner Mongolia is sometimes also grouped as a western province, we group it as a 
central province, which is in line with its economic characteristics and with the grouping described by the State 
Council of China (1986). 
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provinces. Consumption-based emissions exacerbate that trend, because the eastern provinces 
consume more goods and associated CO2 emissions than they produce (see Figure A1 in the 
appendix). The distribution of emissions intensity shows an opposite trend, i.e. lower emissions 
intensity in the eastern provinces and higher emissions intensity in the central and western 
provinces, which reflects differences in technological progress and industrial composition. 
2.2 Permit Allocation across China’s Provinces 
We follow Rose et al. (1998) in their general methodology of mathematically specifying 
different permit-allocation schemes. To obtain the allocation of emissions permits for region r 
and allocation scenario i (  
 ), we distribute a national emissions target (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) among Chinese 
provinces in proportion to their share with respect to the chosen reference base (  
 ):  
  
  
  
 
∑   
 
 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                                                                                      (1) 
 
For example, the egalitarian scenario allocates emissions permits in proportion to a region’s 
population divided by the total population and multiplied by the national emissions target. To 
specify the consumer-pays criterion, we calculate consumption-based emissions using a 
multiregional input–output approach that accounts for the emissions embodied in China’s 
interregional trade (see Böhringer et al., 2011, and in particular Springmann et al., 2013).
2
 
The basis for each allocation scenario is a stylized national emissions trading system in which 
the national emissions cap is set 17.7% below benchmark emissions. This emissions target 
results in emissions-intensity reductions of around 17%, the target of China’s Twelfth Five-Year 
Plan (2011-2015). Although we adopt an emissions-intensity target consistent with China’s 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan, our objective is not to simulate its future economic impacts. Instead our 
objective is to gain insights into the relative economic and distributional impacts of different 
approaches for allocating emissions permits. 
We constrain the permit allocation such that no province can be allocated more than its 
baseline emissions. The purpose of this “stand-alone rule” (Lange et al., 2007) is to avoid 
undermining emissions-reduction efforts in overallocated provinces, which may be viewed as 
                                                 
2
 The outcome-based allocation scenarios (vertical and horizontal) depart from this methodology because they 
impose constraints on the outcome of economic model simulations. The horizontal EQU scenario equalizes the 
proportional welfare impacts across all provinces and the vertical PRG scenario distributes welfare losses in 
proportion to per capita GDP. The details of the economic model and the model simulations are described in 
Section 3. 
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unacceptable by constrained provinces.
3 
 A sensitivity analysis contained in Appendix A2 shows 
that without the constraint, the PPP, CPP, and ABT scenarios would allocate more emissions 
permits to the western provinces. The analysis indicates that this overallocation would result in 
disproportional wealth transfers (in terms of permit revenues) from the eastern provinces to the 
central and western ones, and in significant welfare losses for the eastern provinces. 
4
    
 
 
Figure 3. Regional permit allocation to China’s eastern, central, and western provinces for 
the different allocation scenarios described in Table 1 and a REG scenario which 
represents the static emissions-reduction equivalent of the regional emissions-intensity 
targets of China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan. The dashed horizontal lines indicate the 
aggregated benchmark emissions for the eastern, central, and western provinces.  
 
Figure 3 displays the regional allocation of emissions permits for the allocation scenarios 
considered. Table A2 in the appendix lists the permit allocation for each province. Several 
scenarios exhibit similar allocative characteristics (after each provinces’ permit allocation has 
been constrained to not exceed its benchmark emissions). The ERE and SOV scenarios allocate 
most emissions permits to the eastern provinces because their allocation methods reward low 
emissions intensity (ERE) and high emissions (SOV). The central provinces are allocated about a 
third less emissions permits than the eastern provinces, and the western provinces about half. In 
                                                 
3
 Allocated permits that would exceed the constraint are redistributed according to each scenario's allocation factor 
(
  
 
∑   
 
 
) with the summation indices including the provinces among which the permits are to be redistributed. The 
redistribution procedure is carried out until no province is allocated permits in excess of its baseline emissions. 
4
 An alternative approach to avoid overallocation would be to construct aggregate allocation scenarios as a 
combination of multiple allocation schemes. The sensitivity analysis contained in Appendix A2 shows that this 
could reduce the amount of overallocation, but it may still result in overallocation to individual provinces if the 
commonly suggested combinations of allocation schemes are used. 
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line with the allocation method of the SOV scenario, each province is allocated the same 
proportional 17.7% reduction of emissions permits compared to current benchmark emissions. 
Going from the EGA scenario to the ABT scenario, fewer emissions permits are allocated to 
the eastern provinces and more to the central and western ones. The shift in permit allocation is 
small in the EGA scenario as the eastern provinces have a greater population on aggregate than 
the central and western ones. However, the proportional cutback between benchmark emissions 
and emissions-permit allocation for the eastern provinces increases to 33–35% in the PRG, PPP, 
ESU, CPP, and ABT scenarios. This is in line with the scenarios’ allocation methods which allot 
more emissions permits to the provinces with low emissions (PPP), high emissions intensities 
(ESU), low consumption (CPP), and low per capita GDP (ABT, PRG), all of which are 
concentrated more in the center and west than in the east. As a result of the stand-alone rule, the 
PPP, ESU, CPP, and ABT scenarios allocate permits in proportion to benchmark emissions to 
many western provinces, while permit allocations in the PRG scenario approach benchmark 
levels in some central provinces. 
In order to understand how the distributional impacts compare with current policy, we further 
compare the menu of allocation schemes described above to regional emissions-intensity targets 
of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan.  The regional emissions-intensity targets of the Twelfth Five-
Year Plan are differentiated by province (see Table A3 in the appendix). However, because their 
regional differentiation is modest, their static emissions-reduction equivalent (REG) is similar to 
the reduction of emissions permits with respect to benchmark emissions in the ERE, SOV, and 
EGA scenarios which feature similar proportional cutbacks in emissions permits for each 
region.
5
 
3. ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DIFFERENT PERMIT ALLOCATION 
We now turn to simulate the economic and distributional effects of allocating emissions 
permits in a Chinese ETS according to the scenarios described above. For this analysis, we use 
an energy–economic model with regional detail for the Chinese economy (see Zhang et al., 
2013). We provide a short model description followed by a discussion of the results. 
3.1 Energy–Economic Model 
The energy–economic model is a static multiregional multisector computable general 
equilibrium model based on optimizing behavior of economic agents. Consumers maximize 
welfare subject to budget constraints and producers combine intermediate inputs and primary 
                                                 
5
 We have calculated the static emissions-reduction equivalent of the REF scenario by using the energy–economic 
model as described in section 3. 
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factors at least cost to produce output. Energy resources are included as primary factors and their 
use is associated with the emission of carbon dioxide (CO2). The production of energy and other 
goods is described by nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) production functions 
which specify the input composition and substitution possibilities among inputs. Inputs into 
production include labor, capital, natural resources (coal, natural gas, crude oil, and land), and 
intermediate inputs. Appendix A5 contains further details on the model’s nesting structure. The 
model is formulated as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) (Mathiesen, 1985; Rutherford, 
1995) in which zero-profit and market-clearance conditions determine activity levels and prices.
6
  
The model is calibrated to a comprehensive energy-economic data set which includes a 
consistent representation of energy markets in physical units, as well as detailed economic 
accounts for the year 2007. The data set is global, but includes regional detail for China's 
provinces. The global data comes from the database version 8 of the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP, Narayanan et al., 2012). Results for the rest of the world are aggregated at the 
level of three international regions (Europe, USA, and the rest of the world) to capture the 
international market impacts of distributional changes within China. The data for China is based 
on the country’s national input–output table and the full set of provincial input–output tables 
published in 2007 (National Information Center of China, 2011) as described in Section 2. We 
resolve six energy sectors and 10 non-energy composites.
7 
 Elasticities of substitution are 
adopted from the GTAP 8 database, as well as from the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy 
Analysis (EPPA) model (Paltsev et al., 2005). 
Although we calibrate our energy-economic model to the latest available data, we note that 
the model results are best seen as illustrative of the general trends and relative trade-offs between 
the ETS allocation scenarios. In general, numerical results are influenced by the specific model 
setup and therefore subject to model and parameter uncertainty. In contrast, the relative changes 
across the different allocation scenarios can be seen as sufficiently robust (see Zhang et al., 2013, 
for a comprehensive sensitivity analysis on the effects of market distortions and parameter 
assumptions using the same energy-economic model applied here). Our choice of a static 
modeling framework increases the transparency of model impacts and avoids the uncertainties 
associated with future growth paths. 
                                                 
6
 The model is formulated in the mathematical programming system MPSGE (Rutherford, 1999), a subsystem of 
GAMS, and solved by using PATH (Dirkse and Ferris, 1995). 
7
 The energy goods include coal (COL), crude oil (CRU), refined-oil and coal products (OIL), natural gas (GAS), 
gas manufacture and distribution (GDT), and electricity (ELE); the non-energy sectors include agriculture 
(AGR), minerals mining (OMN), light industries (LID), energy-intensive industries (EID), transport equipment 
(TME), other manufacturing industries (OID), water (WTR), trade (TRD), transport (TRP), other service 
industry (OTH). 
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3.2 Permit Transfers and Welfare Impacts 
In an ETS, the trade in emissions permits results in the equalization of marginal abatement 
costs across provinces leading to a cost-efficient distribution of emissions reductions. Of interest 
under each scenario is the final distribution of emissions reductions, the transfer of permits 
supporting this distribution, as well as the resulting changes in welfare levels for the different 
ETS allocation scenarios considered.  
All national ETS scenarios result in a common cost-effective distribution of emissions 
reductions that can differ significantly from the initial distribution of emissions permits in each 
scenario. Although the absolute emissions reductions are similar for the eastern, central, and 
western provinces (about 330 MtCO2 on average), the western provinces reduce emissions the 
most on a percentage basis—by 27% on aggregate—followed by the central and eastern 
provinces which reduce their emissions by 20% and 12%, respectively (see Table A4 in the 
appendix). Underlying this cost-effective distribution of emissions reductions are regional 
differences in marginal abatement costs, which are highest in the eastern provinces and lowest in 
the western ones—the distribution of emissions intensities is indicative of those differences (see 
Figure 2). The distribution of emissions reductions contrasts with the allocation of emissions 
permits. The differences are especially pronounced in the PPP, ESU, CPP, and ABT scenarios in 
which most of the western provinces are allocated their benchmark emissions and the eastern 
provinces are allocated 35% less permits than their benchmark emissions on aggregate.  
Figure 4 shows the permit (and associated financial) transfers that occur to achieve the 
distribution of emissions reductions in each ETS scenario. The permit transfers emerge as the 
difference between the cost-efficient distribution of emissions reductions and the emissions 
permits allocated in each scenario. Provincial-level transfers are listed in Table A5 in the 
appendix. In each scenario, the eastern provinces are, on aggregate, net buyers of emissions 
permits, while the central and western provinces are net sellers. The permit and revenue transfers 
increase from about 130–160 MtCO2 for USD 1.9–2.3 billion in the ERE and SOV scenarios to 
560–660 MtCO2 for USD 8.3–9.8 billion in the PRG, PPP, ESU, CPP, and ABT scenarios, 
which is in line with the reduction in the amount of emissions permits allocated to the eastern 
provinces in those scenarios.  
Permit-transfer revenues are distributed according to the difference in permits allocated to the 
central and western provinces. The PPP, ESU, CPP, and ABT scenarios exhibit a roughly equal 
split of permit sales between the central and western provinces, which is in line with their 
similarity in absolute emissions reductions and close-to-benchmark permit allocation. In the 
EQU and PRG scenarios, proportionally more permits are allocated to the central provinces than 
to western ones, while proportionally more permits are allocated to the western provinces in the 
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ERE, SOV, and EGA scenarios. As a result, more permits are sold by the central provinces in the 
EQU and PRG scenarios, and more by the western provinces in the ERE, SOV, and EGA 
scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 4. Regional distribution of permit transfers in in billion USD (left axis) and MtCO2  
(right axis).  
Figure 5 shows the regional welfare impacts in terms of equivalent variation of income for 
the different ETS allocation scenarios. Provincial-level welfare impacts are listed in Table A6 in 
the appendix. Each ETS scenario results in a cost-efficient distribution of emissions reductions 
with the same national welfare impact. However, regional welfare impacts differ according to 
each province’s permit allocation, marginal abatement costs, and transfer of permit revenues. As 
a consequence, the ERE, SOV, and EGA scenarios exhibit low welfare losses for the eastern 
provinces, but high losses for the central ones (as those are particularly reliant on fossil-fuel 
production), while the PRG, PPP, ESU, CPP, and ABT scenarios show low welfare losses or 
even gains for the western provinces, but greater losses for the eastern ones. By definition, the 
EQU scenario yields a proportionally equal burden for all provinces.  
The impacts of the ETS allocation scenarios described above differ markedly from those of 
China’s current policy approach of imposing regional CO2 intensity targets without allowing for 
interprovincial trading. In Appendix A9, we compare the welfare impacts of those policy 
approaches and find that the non-tradable regional targets increase national welfare loss by 30%. 
The model results indicate that the central and western provinces would decrease their welfare 
losses in all allocation schemes when moving from the regional target allocation of China’s 
Twelfth Five Year Plan to a national ETS. In contrast, the eastern provinces would decrease their 
welfare losses only in the ERE, SOV, and EGA scenarios, but their welfare decreases more in the 
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EQU, PRG, PPP, ESU, CPP, and ABT scenarios. The potentially negative consequences for the 
eastern provinces in the latter scenarios may hinder their adoption given the political influence of 
those provinces. 
 
 
Figure 5. Regional distribution of welfare impacts in terms of equivalent variation of income 
(EV) for the different allocation scenarios. The ERE and SOV scenarios and the PPP, ESU, 
CPP, ABT are associated with similar welfare impacts; we group these scenarios 
together (by taking the average values) for ease of presentation. The figure serves as 
basis for the survey described in Section 4. 
4. CHOOSING AMONG ALLOCATION SCHEMES 
The preceding analysis provided an overview of the distribution of economic impacts under a 
wide range of allocation schemes applied to the Chinese context. Each allocation scheme is 
supported by a specific equity criterion and therefore justifiable from a particular ethical 
position. This complicates the selection and recommendation of a particular allocation rule to 
policymakers. Instead of assuming an equity rule that would be most compelling in China, we 
conducted a survey to scope the views on the different allocation schemes and, more generally, 
on the importance of the interregional distribution of burden in a future ETS in China. 
4.1 Survey Overview 
The survey was distributed among Chinese research groups involved in the analysis and 
design of climate policy in China. In general, input from expert research groups is very important 
in China’s policy process (Cao, 2004; Meidan et al., 2009). In the process of establishing pilot 
emissions trading schemes as part of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, the government regularly seeks 
input from research groups on the design of a future emissions trading system, and the policy 
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advice provided to the government has, in many instances, been based on model assessments. We 
therefore focus on research groups with modeling capacity in national climate policies as target 
group for our survey.   
The survey was distributed at two instances in June 2013 in China. The first instance was a 
CGE modeling workshop organized by the Center for Energy Economic and Strategy Studies 
(CEESS) of Fudan University, held on June 14–15, 2013, in Shanghai. The second was the 
Annual Stakeholders Meeting of the Tsinghua-MIT China Energy and Climate Project (CECP), 
held on June 18, 2013, in Beijing. Table A7 in the appendix contains a list of the institutional 
affiliations of the participating researchers. Before distributing the survey, we conducted two 
target-group assessments at an ETS workshop organized by the European Commission 
Directorate-General for Climate Action in Beijing on May 22, 2013, and at the Environment and 
Energy Track of the Shanghai Forum, which took place on May 25–27, 2013, in Shanghai. Based 
on those assessments, we are comfortable with the representation of relevant research teams in 
our focus group. 
The questionnaire administered in the survey was structured into four parts. The first elicited 
the participants’ general views on the importance of distributional issues (equity) and of 
efficiency. The second part asked the participants to distribute the burden of emissions reduction 
among China’s regions (eastern, central, western) and express their opinion on different burden-
sharing rules. The third part presented participants with the model outcomes discussed in the last 
section (Figure 5) and asked for their preferred outcome and unacceptable outcomes. The welfare 
impacts were first presented without scenario labels and then with scenario labels and brief 
descriptions of the equity criteria supporting each allocation scenario. The intention behind this 
two-stage approach was to elicit participants’ distributional preferences with and without the 
ethical framing. The participants were given the option to change their preferences based on the 
information provided. Finally, the questionnaire asked for some background information, such as 
age, affiliation, and regions of origin and residence. 
4.2 Survey Results 
We received 44 responses. However, not all participants answered all questions, and as a 
result the number of responses differs across the questions. Table A8 in the appendix lists the 
participants’ characteristics. Almost all respondents (41 out of 44; 93%) declare themselves as 
academics and about half of the respondents are below 30 years of age. Although three-fourths of 
the respondents now live in eastern China (77%), more than half of the respondents were born in 
central and western China (43% and 11%, respectively).  
Table 2 summarizes the respondents’ attitudes toward equity. Over 80% of the respondents 
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declare that they are concerned with the way the economic burden of greenhouse gas reduction is 
distributed among China’s provinces and more than half think that fairly distributing the burden 
of emissions reduction has the same importance as reducing emissions at least cost. 
Table 2. Survey questions related to equity concerns and the trade-off between equity and 
efficiency. 
Participants' attitudes toward equity Frequency Percent 
How concerned you are with the way the economic 
burden of greenhouse gas reduction is distributed 
among China’s provinces? 
  
Very concerned 24 54.55 
Somewhat concerned 12 27.27 
Neutral 6 13.64 
Not very concerned 2 4.55 
Not concerned at all 0 0 
What is most important for you: a fair distribution 
of emissions reduction burden (equity), reducing 
emissions at least cost (efficiency), or both? 
    
Both are equally important. 24 54.55 
Reducing emissions at least cost is more important. 12 27.27 
A fair distribution of reduction burden is more important. 8 18.18 
 
When prompted to distribute the burden of emissions reduction among China’s regions, 
assuming that the distribution of burden does not increase overall costs, most respondents would 
put a medium-high to high burden on the eastern provinces (89%), a medium burden on the 
central provinces (66%), and a low to medium-low burden on the western provinces (75%). The 
associated distribution of frequencies is shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 7 details the respondents’ preferences for specific allocation schemes. When presented 
with the simulated welfare impacts of the specific unlabelled burden-sharing criteria considered 
in this study, 41% chose the progressive (PRG) scenario as their most preferred one, followed by 
the aggregate of polluter pays, consumer pays, ability to pay, and environmental subsidy 
(PPP/CPP/ABT/ESU) which was chosen by 27%; the egalitarian (EGA) scenario was chosen by 
the least (7%). When asked which of the different outcomes would be unacceptable (multiple 
choices were possible here), 57% of the respondents indicated that they would not be willing to 
accept the sovereignty and environmental reward (SOV/ERE) scenarios, 34% would not accept 
the equal impact (EQU) scenario, and 30% would not accept the egalitarian (EGA) scenario. 
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Figure 6. Respondents’ preferences for the regional distribution of emissions-reduction 
burden among the eastern, central, and western provinces.   
 
 
Figure 7. Respondents’ preference for the specific allocation schemes considered in this 
study. The initial preferences followed the presentation of unlabeled welfare outcomes, 
the final preferences the presentation of labeled outcomes and scenario descriptions, 
and the unacceptable criteria indicate the schemes the respondents found unacceptable 
when first presented (with multiple choices possible). 
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When the burden-sharing scenarios were identified, a third of the respondents (32%) changed 
their preference, mostly from the PRG scenario to the PPP/CPP/ABT/ESU one. While most 
respondents did not provide a reason for that change, those who did noted that the aggregate 
PPP/CPP/ABT/ESU scenario is more comprehensive and that it considers both responsibility and 
capacity. The final distribution of preferences (depicted in Figure 7) shows that 43% would 
prefer the PPP/CPP/ABT/ESU scenario, 30% the PRG scenario, 11% the EQU scenario, 9% the 
SOV/ERE scenario, and 7% the EGA scenario.  
Figure 8 reports the respondents’ agreement with each of the burden-sharing criteria 
represented in the most preferred PPP/CPP/ABT/ESU scenario. When asked about their 
agreement on the individual burden-sharing criteria in the PPP/CPP/ABT/ESU group, the 
respondents indicated strongest agreement with the CPP criterion, followed by the PPP, ESU, 
and ABT scenarios (when first ranking the frequencies for “strongly agree” and then those for 
“somewhat agree”). 
 
 
Figure 8. Respondents’ agreement with the individual allocation schemes summarized in 
the PPP/ESU/CPP/ABT group (see Figure 5). 
4.3. Discussion of Survey Results 
The results of the survey provide insight into the relative merits of alternative burden-sharing 
scenarios according to scholars involved in China’s climate policy design. Interestingly, we find 
that most favor a higher burden on the east and lower burden on the center and west. However, 
we also observe that the framing of the scenarios is important. The observed shift in participant 
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preferences from PRG scenario to the PPP/CPP/ABT/ESU scenario after the corresponding 
equity principles are revealed supports this conclusion. Given emphasis in previous studies from 
scholars in China on creating combined equity indices, policy designs that address multiple 
criteria may turn out to be an important alternative to single-criteria designs. Multi-criteria 
designs may also attract the support of otherwise disparate vested policy interests that prefer a 
single equity criterion but are open to supporting designs reflecting other principles as well. 
Given the highly differentiated impacts of the different allocation scenarios on China’s 
regions, one could expect that the respondents’ preferences are influenced by their region of 
origin or their residence.8  However, our analysis, supported by detailed results shown in 
Appendix A12, does not provide strong support for that expectation. Although we find that most 
respondents living in central provinces prefer the PRG scenario which puts least burden on their 
provinces compared to other scenarios, a higher number of respondents living in the eastern 
provinces prefers the PPP/CPP/ABT/ESU scenario which puts the greatest burden on the eastern 
provinces. Reasons for the small effect of regional association may be the selection of 
respondents and the structure of environmental governance in China. Our target group was 
comprised of experts who provide regular input into the policymaking process. Traditionally, 
environmental (including climate) policy issues are often addressed at the central level in China, 
and balancing impacts across regions is often an important consideration. Thus, the experts in 
our target group may adopt a regionally more balanced view on distributional and efficiency 
issues than lay persons or representatives from affected industries.  
There are several caveats to bear in mind when interpreting the survey results. First, we 
cannot rule out occasional misinterpretations of survey questions. Although the target group was 
comprised of experts, the abstract concepts related to equity and technical modeling results may 
have been confusing to some respondents. In particular the EQU (equal welfare losses imposed 
across all provinces) may not have been well understood by survey respondents, given that it is 
based on a theoretical construct and not on a tangible indicator or indicators, which have been 
used to guide the setting of China’s energy and climate policy to date. We tried to address this 
point by proving explanatory paragraphs, bilingual questionnaires, and possibilities for personal 
feedback. Second, our target group consisted of climate-policy experts and therefore does not 
represent broader views on desirable distributional outcomes in China. In future studies, it would 
be interesting to explore how the views of experts compare with those held by policymakers, 
representatives of affected industries, or the views of the public at large. Finally, the survey’s 
                                                 
8
 By “residence” we are referring to physical residence, not registered (hukou) residence. 
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regional aggregation into three broad regions may hide some regional differences and the 
respondents’ interests in the impacts for specific provinces. 
5. CONCLUSION 
China has embarked on an ambitious pathway for establishing a national carbon market in the 
next five to ten years. In this study, we have analyzed the distributional aspects of a Chinese ETS 
from ethical, economic, and stated-preference perspectives. We have focused on the role of 
emissions permit allocation and showed that a wide range of potential allocation schemes exist, 
each supported by a specific equity principle. The economic analysis has shown that several 
allocation schemes exhibit similar distributional characteristics in terms of regional welfare 
impacts and flows of emissions permits when overallocation is ruled out. 
A survey we conducted among climate-policy researchers in China has indicated a relative 
preference for those allocation schemes that put less emissions-reduction burden on the western 
provinces, a medium burden on the central provinces, and a high burden on the eastern 
provinces. When presented with the specific allocation schemes considered in this study, most 
respondents preferred the welfare outcome associated with the equity criteria of polluter pays, 
consumer pays, ability to pay, and ecological subsidy, noting that this combination of criteria is 
most comprehensive, while at the same time being in line with the respondents’ general 
distributional preferences. 
From a fiscal perspective, each allocation scheme would imply significant interregional 
transfers. In each allocation scheme, the eastern provinces are found to be net buyers of 
emissions permits, with permit payments to the western and central provinces ranging between 
USD 2–10 billion depending on the allocation scheme. In comparison, the annual equalization 
transfer, which was established by the Chinese government in 1995 to ease the widening regional 
disparities, amounted to about USD 9 billion (74.5 billion Yuan) in 2004 (Shen et al., 2012). The 
financial transfers associated with an ETS would therefore constitute a significant flow of 
interregional funds. An added benefit is that the market-based nature of those flows may make 
them more robust and predictable than budgetary government transfers which have been subject 
to fluctuation in the past (Shen et al., 2012). However, a market-based scheme also means that 
the magnitude of the interregional flows will be subject to fluctuations in the carbon price. 
From a political perspective, adopting allocation schemes which generate large interregional 
transfers could be challenging. An analysis of the regional emissions-intensity targets of China’s 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan has shown that the eastern provinces currently shoulder a relatively 
modest reduction burden compared to that of the central and western provinces (Springmann et 
al., 2013). An analysis in Appendix A9 indicates that the eastern provinces would experience a 
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greater economic burden in the allocation scenarios which generate high interregional transfers, 
such as those preferred by most survey participants. The potentially negative consequences for 
the eastern provinces in those scenarios may hinder adoption given the political and economic 
influence that those provinces have. However, there may exist room for negotiation between the 
central government and the provinces on specific allocation schemes, as moving from regional 
targets to an ETS could significantly reduce welfare losses.  
Although our analysis has focused on the Chinese context, its approach of studying the 
distributional impacts of regional emissions allocation within a national emissions-trading 
system has international implications. Balancing economic efficiency with distributional and 
equity concerns can be expected to play a key role in other emerging carbon markets, in 
particular in countries with large regional inequalities and uneven economic development, such 
Brazil, Chile, Turkey, Mexico, and the United States. By combining economic modeling with 
survey techniques, our study represents a more comprehensive analysis than those relying on one 
method alone. Such multi-method approaches may prove compelling as a way to identify 
consensus options in the policy design process.  
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A1. CONSUMPTION-BASED EMISSIONS INVENTORIES 
Consumption-based emissions inventories add to production-based emissions those emissions 
that are embodied in imports (  
  ), but subtract those emissions that are embodied in exports 
(  
  ): 
  
      
      
     
     
       (1) 
 
where        
     
    denotes the balance of emissions embodied in trade (BEET) (see, e.g., 
Peters and Hertwich, 2008), also referred to as emissions transfer (Peters et al., 2011). 
 
Figure A1. Balance of emissions embodied in trade (BEET) between China's provinces. 
Positive numbers indicate a greater share of emissions embodied in imports than those 
embodied in exports. 
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For obtaining the interregional emissions transfers we apply a recursive diagonalization 
algorithm as described in Böhringer et al. (2011).  Figure A.1 provides an overview of China's 
interregional emissions transfers (see Springmann et al., 2013 for a more detailed description). 
On net, the eastern provinces import about 350 MtCO2 of embodied emissions, i.e. 14% of their 
territorial emissions. Sixty percent of those emissions (212 MtCO2) are embodied in imports 
from the central provinces and 40% (136 MtCO2) in imports from the western provinces. The 
percentage emissions transfers for individual regions can be much larger than the average. For 
example, the eastern provinces of Zhejiang, Hainan, and Beijing each import embodied 
emissions which amount to more than 70% of their territorial emissions. On the other hand, the 
central province of Inner Mongolia (Neimenggu) and the western province of Guizhou each 
export embodied emissions which amount to more than 40% of their territorial emissions. 
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A2. UNCONSTRAINED ALLOCATION SERIES  
Table A1. Permit allocation, permit transfers, and welfare impacts for the unconstrained 
allocation scenarios and for an aggregate allocation scenario (AGG). The AGG scenario is 
loosely based on an aggregate index for regional target allocation constructed by Yi et al. 
(2011) which combines emissions (to indicate responsibility), inverse emissions intensities 
(to indicate potential), and inverse per capita emissions (to indicate capacity). 
Allocation 
scenario 
Permit allocation (MtCO2) Permit transfers (USD billion) Change in EV (%) 
Eastern Central Western Eastern Central Western Eastern Central Western 
ERE 2386 1198 1075 0.85 -3.50 2.65 -0.238 -3.063 -0.629 
SOV 2171 1482 1007 -2.33 0.70 1.64 -0.634 -1.953 -1.024 
EQU 1954 1705 1000 -5.51 3.99 1.52 -1.051 -1.051 -1.051 
EGA 1861 1590 1208 -6.93 2.31 4.62 -1.198 -1.561 0.151 
PRG 1765 1805 1089 -8.31 5.47 2.84 -1.401 -0.664 -0.524 
PPP 1745 928 1986 -8.62 -7.46 16.09 -1.568 -4.025 4.564 
CPP 1315 1083 2261 -14.96 -5.17 20.13 -2.291 -3.435 6.151 
ESU 1035 1335 2289 -19.06 -1.40 20.46 -2.806 -2.495 6.360 
ABT 1014 818 2826 -19.32 -9.00 28.31 -2.910 -4.521 9.210 
AGG 1837 1387 1436 -7.27 -0.70 7.98 -1.258 -2.315 1.485 
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A3. PERMIT ALLOCATION BY PROVINCE  
Table A2. Permit allocation (MtCO2) by province. 
Region ERE SOV EGA EQU PRG PPP ESU CPP ABT 
ANH 179 147 179 149 168 179 179 179 179 
BEJ 108 89 68 126 85 108 108 108 92 
CHQ 118 97 117 127 134 118 118 118 118 
FUJ 148 122 148 84 86 148 148 148 148 
GAN 73 117 108 122 128 143 143 143 143 
GUD 342 281 342 202 168 179 122 178 178 
GXI 116 95 116 70 83 116 116 116 116 
GZH 79 130 156 89 100 158 158 158 158 
HAI 23 19 23 20 23 23 23 23 23 
HEB 169 294 287 277 288 172 288 228 296 
HEN 226 243 296 230 250 208 215 231 296 
HLJ 173 142 158 212 218 173 173 173 173 
HUB 206 170 207 93 107 207 207 207 207 
HUN 187 154 187 170 187 187 187 187 187 
JIL 137 144 113 133 140 175 175 175 175 
JSU 358 302 315 231 207 167 136 149 150 
JXI 112 92 112 86 96 112 112 112 112 
LIA 178 228 178 239 240 221 273 247 224 
NMG 113 206 100 252 251 245 250 250 219 
NXA 32 26 25 29 31 32 32 32 32 
QIH 41 69 23 65 66 83 83 83 83 
SHA 114 94 114 150 159 114 114 114 114 
SHD 277 345 388 314 311 146 176 148 208 
SHH 199 164 77 120 57 199 172 199 85 
SHX 115 183 140 381 387 222 222 222 222 
SIC 190 157 190 159 181 190 190 190 190 
TAJ 131 108 46 119 107 131 131 131 125 
XIN 118 97 87 129 134 118 118 118 118 
YUN 131 124 151 59 72 151 151 151 151 
ZHJ 266 219 209 220 194 231 136 139 137 
Eastern 2200 2171 2081 1954 1765 1727 1714 1698 1665 
Central 1448 1482 1491 1705 1805 1709 1721 1737 1770 
Western 1011 1007 1087 1000 1089 1224 1224 1224 1224 
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A4. EMISSIONS INTENSITY TARGETS OF CHINA’S TWELFTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN 
Table A3. Emissions intensity targets of China's Twelfth Five-Year Plan by province. 
Carbon intensity 
reduction target (%) 
Provinces 
19.5 Guangdong 
19 Tianjin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang 
18 Beijing, Hebei, Liaoning, Shandong 
17.5 Fujian, Sichuan 
17 
Shanxi, Jilin, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, 
Hunan, Chongqing, Shannxi 
16.5 Yunnan 
16 
Neimenggu, Heilongjiang, Guangxi, Guizhou, 
Gansu, Ningxia 
11 Hainan, Xinjiang, 
10 Qinghai, Xizang 
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A5. DESCRIPTION OF THE ENERGY-ECONOMIC MODEL 
 
Figure A2. Nesting structure of CES production functions for non-energy goods. 
The production of energy and other goods is described by nested constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) production functions which specify the input composition and substitution 
possibilities between inputs (see Figure A2). Inputs into production include labor, capital, 
natural resources (coal, natural gas, crude oil, and land), and intermediate inputs. For all non-
energy goods, the CES production functions are arranged in four levels. The top-level nest 
combines an aggregate of capital, labor, and energy inputs (KLE) with material inputs (M); the 
second-level nest combines energy inputs (E) with a value-added composite of capital and labor 
inputs (VA) in the KLE-nest; the third-level nest captures the substitution possibilities between 
electricity (ELE) and final-energy inputs (FE) composed, in the fourth-level nest, of coal (COL), 
natural gas (GAS), gas manufacture and distribution (GDT), crude oil (CRU), and refined oil 
products (OIL). 
The production of energy goods is separated into fossil fuels, oil refining and gas manufacture 
and distribution, and electricity production. The production of fossil fuels (COL, GAS, CRU) 
combines sector-specific fossil-fuel resources with a Leontief (fixed-proportion) aggregate of 
intermediate inputs, energy, and a composite of primary factors, described by a Cobb-Douglas 
function of capital, and labor. Oil refining (OIL) and gas manufacture and distribution (GDT) are 
described similarly to the production of other goods, but with a first-level Cobb-Douglas nest 
combining the associated fossil-fuel inputs (crude oil for oil refining; and coal, crude oil, and 
natural gas for gas manufacture and distribution) with material inputs and the capital-labor-
energy (KLE) nest. Electricity production is described by a Leontief nest which combines, in 
fixed proportions, several generation technologies, including nuclear, hydro, and wind power, as 
well as conventional power generation based on fossil fuels. Non-fossil-fuel generation is 
described by a CES nest combining specific resources and a capital-labor aggregate.    
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All industries are characterized by constant returns to scale and are traded in perfectly 
competitive markets. Capital mobility is represented in each sector by following a putty-clay 
approach in which a fraction of previously installed capital becomes nonmalleable in each sector. 
The rest of the capital remains mobile and can be shifted to other sectors in response to price 
changes. The modeling of international trade follows the Armington (1969) approach of 
differentiating goods by country of origin. Thus, goods within a sector and region are represented 
as a CES aggregate of domestic goods and imported ones with associated transport services. 
Goods produced within China are assumed to be closer substitutes than goods from international 
sources to replicate a border effect.  
Final consumption in each region is determined by a representative agent who maximizes 
consumptions subject to its budget constraint. Consumption is represented as a CES aggregate of 
non-energy goods and energy inputs and the budget constraint is determined by factor and tax 
incomes with fixed investment and public expenditure. 
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A6. EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS IN THE ETS ALLOCATION SCENARIOS  
Table A4. Regional emissions reductions in the ETS allocation scenarios. 
Region Emissions Reduction 
MtCO2 % 
Eastern -311 -11.8% 
Western -366 20.3% 
Central -328 -26.8% 
China -1005 -17.7% 
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A7. PERMIT TRANSFERS BY PROVINCE  
Table A5. Value of permit transfers (USD billion) by province. Negative numbers indicate 
payments and positive numbers indicate receipts. 
Region ERE SOV EGA EQU PRG PPP ESU CPP ABT 
ANH 0.430 -0.038 0.430 -0.011 0.267 0.431 0.432 0.432 0.431 
BEJ 0.220 -0.064 -0.383 0.487 -0.131 0.220 0.220 0.220 -0.015 
CHQ 0.289 -0.022 0.262 0.421 0.522 0.289 0.289 0.289 0.289 
FUJ 0.464 0.077 0.464 -0.477 -0.455 0.465 0.466 0.466 0.466 
GAN -0.257 0.401 0.266 0.470 0.563 0.773 0.774 0.774 0.774 
GUD 0.400 -0.498 0.399 -1.674 -2.176 -2.006 -2.858 -2.021 -2.028 
GXI 0.223 -0.080 0.223 -0.448 -0.254 0.224 0.224 0.224 0.224 
GZH -0.209 0.548 0.925 -0.064 0.103 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.966 
HAI 0.045 -0.015 0.045 0.003 0.040 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 
HEB -2.256 -0.414 -0.516 -0.650 -0.500 -2.215 -0.501 -1.380 -0.388 
HEN -0.552 -0.302 0.475 -0.496 -0.200 -0.829 -0.717 -0.477 0.477 
HLJ 0.347 -0.101 0.131 0.911 1.009 0.347 0.347 0.347 0.347 
HUB 1.301 0.771 1.315 -0.366 -0.158 1.315 1.315 1.315 1.315 
HUN 0.635 0.144 0.635 0.381 0.632 0.634 0.635 0.634 0.635 
JIL 0.010 0.112 -0.348 -0.058 0.047 0.571 0.572 0.571 0.572 
JSU 0.357 -0.475 -0.269 -1.523 -1.876 -2.469 -2.933 -2.747 -2.732 
JXI 0.308 0.012 0.308 -0.089 0.073 0.308 0.308 0.308 0.308 
LIA -0.926 -0.187 -0.933 -0.023 -0.019 -0.292 0.477 0.082 -0.255 
NMG -1.308 0.069 -1.509 0.753 0.746 0.659 0.727 0.727 0.267 
NXA 0.079 -0.005 -0.020 0.035 0.060 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 
QIH -0.321 0.087 -0.581 0.034 0.051 0.302 0.302 0.302 0.302 
SHA 0.277 -0.021 0.277 0.799 0.930 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.277 
SHD -1.584 -0.576 0.054 -1.032 -1.081 -3.509 -3.071 -3.485 -2.600 
SHH 0.259 -0.263 -1.549 -0.904 -1.833 0.261 -0.132 0.261 -1.424 
SHX -0.984 0.031 -0.600 2.967 3.052 0.616 0.616 0.616 0.617 
SIC 0.244 -0.256 0.244 -0.226 0.106 0.244 0.245 0.244 0.244 
TAJ 0.319 -0.024 -0.941 0.146 -0.033 0.321 0.322 0.321 0.221 
XIN 0.507 0.199 0.051 0.674 0.746 0.506 0.507 0.506 0.507 
YUN 0.879 0.786 1.183 -0.177 0.014 1.184 1.183 1.183 1.183 
ZHJ 0.801 0.105 -0.037 0.137 -0.247 0.284 -1.117 -1.080 -1.105 
Eastern -1.901 -2.335 -3.666 -5.510 -8.310 -8.894 -9.081 -9.318 -9.815 
Central 0.188 0.699 0.836 3.992 5.469 4.052 4.236 4.474 4.970 
Western 1.712 1.636 2.830 1.518 2.841 4.842 4.845 4.844 4.846 
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A8. WELFARE IMPACTS BY PROVINCE  
Table A6. Welfare impacts in terms of percentage changes of equivalent variation of 
income by province. 
Region ERE SOV EGA EQU PRG PPP ESU CPP ABT 
ANH -0.165 -1.117 -0.166 -1.051 -0.483 -0.151 -0.151 -0.156 -0.160 
BEJ -1.622 -2.260 -2.995 -1.051 -2.453 -1.659 -1.642 -1.654 -2.188 
CHQ -1.517 -2.663 -1.611 -1.051 -0.666 -1.516 -1.529 -1.523 -1.517 
FUJ 0.824 0.051 0.801 -1.051 -1.025 0.761 0.742 0.745 0.740 
GAN -5.883 -1.497 -2.388 -1.051 -0.425 0.974 0.993 0.987 0.996 
GUD 0.156 -0.368 0.172 -1.051 -1.331 -1.234 -1.722 -1.235 -1.231 
GXI 0.900 0.022 0.899 -1.051 -0.492 0.898 0.904 0.900 0.901 
GZH -1.726 1.647 3.309 -1.052 -0.315 3.492 3.492 3.492 3.492 
HAI -0.451 -1.270 -0.479 -1.051 -0.596 -0.528 -0.561 -0.550 -0.564 
HEB -3.721 -0.614 -0.768 -1.051 -0.788 -3.657 -0.754 -2.241 -0.563 
HEN -1.144 -0.794 0.266 -1.051 -0.640 -1.501 -1.341 -1.018 0.282 
HLJ -2.828 -4.189 -3.477 -1.051 -0.744 -2.791 -2.789 -2.789 -2.784 
HUB 2.121 1.116 2.143 -1.051 -0.656 2.137 2.142 2.140 2.142 
HUN -0.580 -1.461 -0.575 -1.051 -0.596 -0.580 -0.566 -0.571 -0.569 
JIL -0.846 -0.574 -1.871 -1.051 -0.776 0.687 0.679 0.676 0.663 
JSU 0.566 -0.148 0.025 -1.051 -1.356 -1.790 -2.195 -2.039 -2.037 
JXI 0.239 -0.714 0.240 -1.051 -0.533 0.232 0.234 0.234 0.237 
LIA -2.620 -1.335 -2.633 -1.051 -1.043 -1.520 -0.183 -0.871 -1.458 
NMG -8.784 -3.649 -9.496 -1.050 -1.063 -1.448 -1.172 -1.181 -2.866 
NXA -0.203 -1.801 -2.111 -1.051 -0.605 -0.259 -0.294 -0.282 -0.295 
QIH -10.763 0.376 17.887 -1.053 -0.580 6.218 6.232 6.232 6.238 
SHA -2.898 -3.868 -2.908 -1.051 -0.621 -2.846 -2.843 -2.849 -2.863 
SHD -1.507 -0.626 -0.066 -1.051 -1.104 -3.243 -2.869 -3.231 -2.451 
SHH 0.858 0.009 -1.943 -1.051 -2.485 0.766 0.136 0.745 -1.839 
SHX -16.907 -12.764 -15.327 -1.052 -0.712 -10.412 -10.392 -10.401 -10.397 
SIC -0.301 -1.095 -0.299 -1.051 -0.520 -0.294 -0.288 -0.290 -0.288 
TAJ -0.054 -1.780 -6.202 -1.050 -1.920 -0.136 -0.192 -0.173 -0.667 
XIN -1.954 -3.497 -4.251 -1.051 -0.681 -1.928 -1.931 -1.930 -1.926 
YUN 2.382 2.076 3.370 -1.051 -0.426 3.358 3.370 3.366 3.376 
ZHJ -0.243 -1.013 -1.149 -1.051 -1.469 -0.870 -2.338 -2.294 -2.337 
Eastern -0.582 -0.634 -0.788 -1.051 -1.401 -1.479 -1.496 -1.530 -1.583 
Central -2.102 -1.953 -1.932 -1.051 -0.664 -1.056 -1.003 -0.947 -0.824 
Western -1.002 -1.024 -0.574 -1.051 -0.524 0.253 0.256 0.254 0.256 
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A9. COMPARISON OF ETS SCENARIOS TO REGIONAL EMISSIONS-INTENSITY 
TARGETS 
For comparison to the regional emissions-intensity targets of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, we 
simulate their welfare impacts by using the energy-economic model outlined in Section 3 (see 
also Zhang et al., 2013). The regional emissions-intensity targets of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan 
are differentiated by province (see Table A3 in Appendix A4). Figure A3 shows the welfare 
impacts of the regional emissions-intensity targets and those of the different ETS allocation 
scenarios. 
 
 
Figure A3. Welfare impacts in terms of equivalent variation of income (%) for China’s 
eastern, central, and western regions in the different allocation scenarios. The dashed 
horizontal lines indicate the welfare changes associated with the regional emissions-
intensity targets of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (expressed as static emissions-reduction 
equivalents). 
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A10. INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATIONS OF TARGETED FOCUS GROUP MEMBERS  
Table A7. Institutional affiliations of target group members. 
Affiliations of target group members 
Beijing Institute of Technology 
Beijing Normal University 
Chinese Academy of Sciences 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
China Agricultural University 
China Guodian Energy Research Institute 
China University of Petroleum 
Chongqing Technology and Business University 
Development Research Center of the State Council 
Energy Research Institute of the NDRC 
Fudan University 
Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion 
Hunan University 
Renmin University of China 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences 
Shanghai Environment and Energy Exchange 
State Information Center 
Tianjin University of Science and Technology 
Tsinghua University 
Wuhan University 
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A11. CHARACTERISTICS OF SURVEY PARTICIPANTS 
Table A8. Description of survey participants.  
Participants' 
characteristics 
 Frequency Percent 
Affiliation  
Academic 41 93.18 
Government  1 2.27 
Other 2 4.55 
Age 
Below 30 23 52.27 
30 or above 14 31.82 
No information 7 15.91 
Gender 
Female 17 38.64 
Male 26 59.09 
No Information 1 2.27 
Origin 
East 19 43.18 
Central 19 43.18 
West 5 11.36 
No Information 1 2.27 
Residence 
East 34 77.27 
Central 8 18.18 
West 1 2.27 
No Information 1 2.27 
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A12. RESPONDENTS’ PREFERENCES BY REGION OF ORIGIN AND RESIDENCE 
Table A9. Respondents’ final preference for the different ETS allocation scenarios 
differentiated by region of origin.  
Final preference 
Region of origin 
Total 
East Center West No information 
SOV/ERE 1 1 2 0 4 
EGA 2 1 0 0 3 
EQU 2 3 0 0 5 
PRG 6 6 0 1 13 
PPP/CPP/ABT/ESU 8 8 3 0 19 
Total 19 19 5 1 44 
 
Table A10. Respondents’ final preference for the different ETS allocation scenarios 
differentiated by region of residence. 
Final preference 
Region of residence 
Total 
East Center West No information 
SOV/ERE 3 1 0 0 4 
EGA 2 1 0 0 3 
EQU 4 1 0 0 5 
PRG 8 4 0 1 13 
PPP/CPP/ABT/ESU 17 1 1 0 19 
Total 34 8 1 1 44 
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